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MERGERS OF MAJORS: APPLYING THE
FAILING FIRM DOCTRINE IN THE
RECORDED MUSIC INDUSTRY
In favor of the merger is one undeniable fact: EMI is in trouble, and were
it not for Katy Perry, David Guetta and Lady Antebellum, there might be
an entirely different type of legal procedure taking place—the kind that
involves chapters.1
It’s too far gone. I wonder—where did we go wrong?2

INTRODUCTION
To what degree should courts and federal trade regulators concern
themselves with the large-scale mergers of multi-national corporate entities
in the recorded music industry? The recent merger of Universal Music
Group (Universal) with EMI Music (EMI)—respectively the largest and
fourth-largest of the major record companies (the Majors)—resulted in stiff
governmental antitrust regulations3 and critical outcries around the world,4
showcasing society’s historically bitter disapproval of the Majors’ ongoing
consolidation of assets.5 However, as this note demonstrates in the case of
EMI-Universal, many of these concerns are unfounded.
In decades past, the Majors maintained substantial leverage over the
recorded music industry, and horizontal mergers between them created real
and legitimate antitrust concerns. 6 However, nearly every aspect of the
music industry has transitioned to the digital realm, which has largely
eliminated artists’ reliance on the tangible recording, manufacturing, and
distribution capabilities of the Majors. 7 Amid plummeting revenues,

1. Shirley Halperin, EMI and Universal Should Merge, Purge and Start Over (Opinion),
HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 22, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/earshot/emiuniversal-merger-lucian-grainge-irving-azoff-senate-341117.
2. MICK JAGGER, Too Far Gone, on GODDESS IN THE DOORWAY (Virgin Records 2001).
Universal purchased EMI’s recorded music division—including Virgin Records and the rights to
the master recording of this Mick Jagger song—in September 2011. See Tom Pakinkis, Branson
Hopes to Help UMG ‘Reinvigorate’ Virgin Records, MUSIC WEEK (Oct. 15, 2012, 2:12 PM),
http://www.musicweek.com/news/read/branson-hopes-to-help-umg-reinvigorate-virginrecords/052168.
3. See infra Part III.E.
4. See, e.g., infra note 154.
5. See infra Part III.E.
6. See STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION: THE SPECTACULAR CRASH OF
THE RECORD INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 61 (2009).
7. The Universal Music Group/EMI Merger and the Future of Online Music: Hearing Before
the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights, 112th Cong. 9 (2012)
[hereinafter Hearing on Future of Online Music], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76045/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76045.pdf (statement of Irving Azoff, Executive
Chairman, Live Nation Entertainment) (“It used to be that bands could not make a professional
album without the backing of a label. Labels used to be THE gatekeepers to fans. . . . The power
today rests with consumers, not record labels. So while the Internet has brought challenges for
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sizeable cutbacks, and a bungled sales attempt that resulted in financial
delinquency and seizure, EMI-Universal should have implemented the
failing firm doctrine to avoid invasive antitrust regulation and considerable
divestment requirements.
Part I of this note explores the common-law failing firm doctrine in
detail and considers its European Union (E.U.) counterpart: the rescue
merger. Part II offers a brief history and background of the recorded music
industry, and Part III provides an in-depth look at the events that led to the
recent merger of EMI and Universal. Part IV applies the various
embodiments of the failing firm doctrine to the EMI-Universal merger. Part
V explores the practical concerns arising from applying the failing firm
doctrine to the EMI-Universal merger, and Part VI suggests other possible
uses for the doctrine.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. THE FAILING FIRM DOCTRINE
Federal antitrust regulations prevent the consolidation of assets that
unreasonably restrain competition. However, when a company is on the
verge of collapse and the “bankruptcy [attorney] . . . is sharpening her
scythe, readying herself for the role of the Grim Reaper,”8 the firm may
have no choice but “to merge, acquire or be acquired, or choose to sell lossmaking divisions in order to enhance the firm’s viability and profitability.”9
The failing firm doctrine10 is a narrowly tailored defense for these sorts of
companies that are facing antitrust scrutiny from courts and federal
regulatory agencies.11
The Supreme Court of the United States—not Congress—created the
failing firm doctrine in 1930.12 In International Shoe Co. v. FTC, the Court
many, it has also given bands opportunities, access, and control previously unknown to any
generation of artists.”).
8. David Lat, Dewey Have Plans to File for Bankruptcy? Sources Say Yes, ABOVE THE LAW
(May 19, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/05/dewey-have-plans-to-file-forbankruptcy-sources-say-yes/.
9. JOANNIS KOKKORIS & RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL, ANTITRUST LAW AMIDST
FINANCIAL CRISES 104–05 (2010).
10. Authorities use various names, such as “failing company doctrine” and “failing firm
defense,” to refer to the doctrine in question, but the most common word choice is “failing firm
doctrine,” which this note adopts.
11. Marc Paul Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine 1 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University) (on file with Off-Site Library Shelving Facility (ReCAP), Columbia
University).
12. Failing Company Defense: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly &
Bus. Rights, 96th Cong. 15 (1979) [hereinafter Hearing on Failing Company Defense] (statement
of John Shenefield, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice); ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 436 (2007) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK]; ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 273–74 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS];
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held that merging competitors “[do] not substantially lessen competition or
restrain commerce within the intent of the Clayton Act” 13 when the
following two elements are satisfied: (1) the acquired entity’s “resources
[are] so depleted . . . that it face[s] the grave probability of a business failure
. . . [and (2)] there [is] no other prospective purchaser.” 14 Twenty years
later, both the House 15 and Senate 16 gave their nods of approval to the
failing firm doctrine17 in the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act,
which amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act.18
Since International Shoe, “[t]he number of cases in which the courts
have decided that the failing [firm] doctrine was applicable after suit have
been fairly few and far between,” 19 but the doctrine has continued to
develop. 20 The two International Shoe elements have survived, and the
Court may have created an additional one:
In 1969, in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
implied that inability to reorganize a failing company under the
bankruptcy laws might be a third requirement of the failing firm doctrine.
Later Supreme Court decisions, however, omit any reference to the
reorganization possibility as a third requirement, and the few lower courts
that have considered the issue are divided.21

The Department of Justice (the DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission
(the FTC) have expressly recognized the failing firm doctrine and
developed standards in their joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the

KOKKORIS & OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 9, at 172; Robin Mason & Helen Weeds, The
Failing Firm Defence: Merger Policy and Entry 2 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper
No. 3664, 2002); Troy Paredes, Turning the Failing Firm Defense into a Success: A Proposal to
Revise the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 347, 355 (1996). Cf. Blum, supra
note 11, at 29–33 (providing an interesting analysis of International Shoe’s predecessors).
13. Int’l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302–03 (1930).
14. Id. at 302.
15. H.R. REP. No. 81-1191, at 6 (1949).
16. S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 7 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4293, 4299.
17. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 331 (1962); KOKKORIS & OLIVARESCAMINAL, supra note 9, at 170, 172; MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 272–74;
Gilbert H. Montague, The Celler Anti-Merger Act: An Administrative Problem in an Economic
Crisis, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1951, at 253, 324; Blum, supra note 11, at 3, 36. But cf. William F. Baxter,
Remarks: The Failing Firm Doctrine, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 249 (1981–1982) (arguing that
“two very superficial paragraphs in the House and Senate reports” do not demonstrate legislative
approval).
18. See Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2000)).
19. Hearing on Failing Company Defense, supra note 12, at 18.
20. Mason & Weeds, supra note 12, at 2.
21. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 279 (referencing Citizen Publ’g Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969) (“The prospects of reorganization of the Citizen in 1940
would have had to be dim or nonexistent to make the failing company doctrine applicable to this
case.”)).
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Guidelines) to facilitate its implementation. 22 Section 11 of the recently
amended23 Guidelines states that
a merger does not enhance market power if . . .
. . . (1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial
obligations in the near future; (2) it would not be able to reorganize
successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act; and (3) it has made
unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers that
would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant market and
pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger.24

In addition to their incorporation of the International Shoe elements,
the FTC and DOJ have embraced the Citizen Publishing suggestion that a
company have dim prospects of reorganization. 25 Although practitioners
have questioned the reasonability of the reorganization requirement,26 “the
failing firm [doctrine] is seldom employed outside the context of
negotiation with the enforcement agencies.” 27 Accordingly, a successful
application of the doctrine in the United States would likely satisfy all three
DOJ/FTC elements.

22. KOKKORIS & OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 9, at 170–71; MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 280; Paredes, supra note 12, at 353; Bernard A. Nigro, Jr. &
Jonathan S. Kanter, The Effect of Market Conditions on Merger Review – Distressed Industries,
Failing Firms, and Mergers with Bankrupt Companies 9 (ABA Ann. Spring Meeting, 2003),
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-telecom/pdf/distressedindustry
.pdf; Lars Persson, The Auctioning of a Failing Firm 2–3, (Nov. 23, 1998) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Stockholm University), available at http://swopec.hhs.se/iuiwop/papers/iuiwop0514
.pdf.
23. Before 2010, the failing firm doctrine contained an additional element requiring that the
firm’s assets would leave the relevant market, but the latest version of the Guidelines treats the
exit of assets from the market less like a requirement and more like a symptom of the doctrine
itself. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 11 (2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov
/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf (“The Agencies do not normally credit claims that the assets
of the failing firm would exit the relevant market unless all of the following circumstances are
met. . . .”), with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1997 MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.1
(1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11251.pdf (enumerating a fourth element
that “absent the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant market”).
24. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
25. Hearing on Failing Company Defense, supra note 12, at 16 (“Thus, the standards that have
been developed and that are applied in the Antitrust Division are those found in the 1969 decision
in Citizen Publishing Company . . . .”).
26. E.g., Molly S. Boast, Hearings on the Changing Nature of Competition in a Global and
Innovation-Driven Age, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 15, 1995), http://www.ftc.gov/opp
/global/c184104.shtm (“[T]he requirement that the failing firm show it could not emerge
successfully from a reorganization proceeding is both elusive and unduly harsh.”); Katherine B.
Forrest, Remarks at the FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines Workshop: Minority Interests and
Failing Firm Defense 122, (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg
/transcripts/091208transcript.pdf (“[T]he guidelines requirement that you’ve got to demonstrate
that you cannot successfully emerge from Chapter 11 is a very very difficult burden to meet.”).
27. Boast, supra note 26; accord KOKKORIS & OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 9, at 170.
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B. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S APPROACH: THE RESCUE MERGER
Although official European Commission (EC) regulations are devoid of
any reference to the failing firm doctrine, a similar exception—the rescue
merger—does exist in Europe, which was born in case law like its
American counterpart. 28 In its 1993 Kali + Salz decision, 29 the EC
established the three elements of a rescue merger:
[A] merger generally is not the cause of the deterioration of the
competitive structure if it is clear that: the acquired undertaking would in
the near future be forced out of the market if not taken over by another
undertaking, the acquiring undertaking would take over the market share
of the acquired undertaking if it were forced out of the market, [and] there
is no less anticompetitive alternative purchase.30

The EC continues to implement the failing firm doctrine in the European
Union.31
Both in the European Union and the United States, the failing firm
doctrine requires the acquired party to be on the verge of failure. 32 The
FTC/DOJ Guidelines describe “failure” as an inability to meet one’s
financial obligations,33 and the EC focuses on the failing firm’s impending
ejection from the marketplace. 34 Likewise, both jurisdictions compel
acquired parties to make the sale with the least negative effects on
competition.35
However, several key distinctions exist between the American and
European versions of the failing firm doctrine.36 The American Guidelines
requirement that a failing firm be unable to reorganize through bankruptcy37
is absent from the EC standard. 38 In addition, EC case law requires the
acquiring party to show that it would have taken the failing firm’s market
share even if the firm was allowed to fail39—an element not found in the
United States.

28. Mason & Weeds, supra note 12, at 1; Persson, supra note 22, at 3.
29. Commission Decision No. 94/449/EC (Kali + Salz), 1994 O.J. L 186/38, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1994:186:0038:0056:EN:PDF.
30. Id. ¶ 71.
31. KOKKORIS & OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 9, at 111; Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r
for Competition Policy, European Comm’n, Dealing with the Current Financial Crisis (Oct. 6,
2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-498_en.pdf (emphasizing
that “the Commission can and will take into account the evolving market conditions and, where
applicable, the failing firm defence”).
32. See Kali + Salz, 1994 O.J. L 186/30, ¶ 71; MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
33. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
34. Kali + Salz, 1994 O.J. L 186/30, ¶ 71.
35. See Kali + Salz, 1994 O.J. L 186/30, ¶ 71; MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
36. KOKKORIS & OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 9, at 3, 45, 106.
37. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
38. Kali + Salz, 1994 O.J. L 186/30, ¶ 71.
39. Id.
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II. THE RECORDED MUSIC INDUSTRY: A BRIEF HISTORY
Although writers and scientists living as early as the sixteenth century
theorized fantastical methods for capturing and replaying recorded sound,40
inventor Thomas Edison first realized the task in 1877 with the
phonograph,41 which created indentations onto metal cylinders wrapped in
sheets of tin foil. 42 Edison patented the device 43 and created the Edison
Phonograph Company 44 “to take advantage of . . . the public’s growing
interest in the new-fangled sound machines.”45 His discovery “turned the
performance of music into a material object, something you could hold in
your hand, which could be bought and sold.”46
Nearly a decade later, two gentlemen working under the auspices of
Alexander Graham Bell created the graphophone.47 The graphophone was
most notable for replacing the phonograph cylinder’s “frail and fragile”48
tin foil component with wax,49 but “until the introduction of the disc, . . .
every recording was an original: there was no means of mass replication.”50

40. MICHAEL CHANAN, REPEATED TAKES: A SHORT HISTORY OF RECORDING AND ITS
EFFECTS ON MUSIC 1 (1995) (citing FRANÇOIS RABELAIS, THE HISTORIES OF GARGANTUA AND
PANTAGRUEL 566–69 (J.M. Cohen trans., Penguin Books 1955) (1532)); Charles Grivel, The
Phonograph’s Horned Mouth, in WIRELESS IMAGINATION: SOUND, RADIO, AND THE AVANTGARDE 31, 43 (Douglas Kahn & Gregory Whitehead eds., Stephen Sartarelli trans., 1992) (citing
JOH. JOACHIM BECHERS, NÄRRISCHE WEISSHEIT UND WEISE NARRHEIT 27–28 (J.F.R. 1725)
(1683), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=yvETAAAAQAAJ); JOH. BAPTISTÆ
PORTÆ, NEAPOLITANI MAGIÆ NATURALIS LIBRI VIGINTI 567–69 (Apud Petrum Leffen 1651)
(1558), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=7MY5AAAAcAAJ (describing
“Rabelais’s tale of the sea of frozen words, which released voices into the air when it melted[;]”
della Porta’s “way to preserve words, that have been pronounced, inside lead pipes, in such a
manner that they burst forth from them when one removes the cover[;]” and Nuremburg optician
Grundel’s suggestion of “enclosing echoes inside bottles, where he thought they would keep for a
few hours at least”).
41. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 1; Kevin J. Harrang, Challenges in the Global IT Market:
Technology, Creative Content, and Intellectual Property Rights, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 29, 30 (2007);
The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov
/ammem/edhtml/edcyldr.html (last visited June 5, 2013).
42. The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, supra note 41; Harrang, supra note 41, at
30. The device was aptly nicknamed “the talking tin foil.” CHANAN, supra note 40, at 1.
43. Improvement in Phonograph or Speaking Machines, U.S. Patent No. 200,521 (filed Dec.
24, 1877); see also THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RECORDED SOUND IN THE UNITED STATES 512–13
(Guy A. Marco ed., 1993) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RECORDED SOUND] (listing the most
prolific phonograph inventors from 1877–1912 in the order of total patents received—a grouping
that Edison clearly dominates).
44. The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, supra note 41.
45. BRIAN SOUTHALL, THE RISE & FALL OF EMI RECORDS 12 (2009).
46. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 7.
47. See Recording and Reproducing Speech and Other Sounds, U.S. Patent No. 341,214 (filed
June 27, 1885); The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, supra note 41.
48. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 6. The layer of tin foil on Edison’s cylinders “would last for
only a few playings.” The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, supra note 41.
49. The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, supra note 41.
50. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 5.
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Emile Berliner, however, invented the gramophone,51 founded the United
States Gramophone Company in 1893, and replaced the cylinder with a flat,
pre-recorded disc52—a newfound medium for the distribution of recorded
sound that subsequently dominated the recorded music industry for over
half a century.53 Discs were cheaper and easier to produce,54 and cylinder
distributors like Edison were forced to adapt to the new technology.55
Following this “mish-mash” 56 of phonographs, graphophones, and
gramophones and the ensuing popularity of discs containing pre-recorded
music,57 the music industry grew rapidly.58 By the beginning of World War
I, “Britain . . . had almost eighty record companies, the United States by the
end of the same decade almost two hundred,”59 and “a third of all British
households owned some sort of gramophone.” 60 “[T]he early recording
companies made both phonograph and phonogram, record player and
record.” 61 However, music companies soon realized that profits from the
sale of records were outpacing the smaller profits from talking machine
sales.62 “They accordingly shifted their focus to records, thus creating the
music recording industry.”63
The pioneers of the recorded music industry established “a model of
consumption . . . which treated the record like a book, and not like, say, a
photograph.”64 These record companies “created revenue-generating assets
in the form of copyrights and contracts with artists who would generate
copyrights.”65 Music companies exist in two parts—the recording company,
which manages the phonorecords and sound recordings contained therein,
and the publisher, which controls the rights of the actual musical
composition.66

51. See generally Gramophone, U.S. Patent No. 372,786 (filed May 4, 1887) (Berliner’s patent
for the Gramophone).
52. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 27–28.
53. History, EMI MUSIC, http://www.emimusic.com/about/history/ (last visited June 5, 2013).
54. Harrang, supra note 41, at 31.
55. Id.
56. SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 12.
57. The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, supra note 41.
58. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 54.
59. Id.
60. SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 17.
61. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 32.
62. Conrad Shayo & Ruth Guthrie, From Edison to MP3: A Struggle for the Future of the
Music Recording Industry, INT’L J. CASES ON ELEC. COM., Apr.–June 2005, at 1, 4.
63. Id.
64. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 28–29.
65. Gerben Bakker, The Making of a Music Multinational: PolyGram’s International
Businesses, 1945–1998, 80 BUS. HIST. REV. 81, 92 (2006); see also CHANAN, supra note 40, at 15
(describing how the Gramophone Company utilized this rights-based business model in its
“training centres”).
66. The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, supra note 41.
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The emerging major record companies established offices internationally to
reach untapped markets.67 As Professor Bakker explains,
A handful of singular firms managed to adapt their strategies and
organizational structures to the new environment. Along the way, they
combined the assets of firms less able to adapt (such as RCA, Decca,
Mercury, and MGM Records) with those of smaller, younger firms,
reconfiguring their acquisitions into large international federations.68

In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, “sales of sound recordings grew an average
of 20% a year”69 and the infamous “CD boom” from the mid-1980s to early
2000s produced unimaginable sales 70 and profits 71 figures. While the
digitization of music proved immensely valuable until the end of the second
millennium, the advent of widely accessible internet access reversed the
fortunes of the recorded music industry. 72 Proven distribution and
manufacturing methods became immediately outdated, 73 and “a rapidly
evolving market [emerged] with an increasing array of choices of
consumers.”74
Apple Inc. released the iPod in 200175 and the iTunes store in 2003.76
Selling physical albums had allowed record companies to bundle a dozen or
more songs onto one indivisible unit to maximize profits, but online music
stores allowed consumers to pick and choose their favorite songs for a small
fraction of the cost of the entire album. 77 Simultaneously, file-sharing
websites like Limewire, Kazaa, and Grokster emerged and allowed listeners
to share sound recordings without the permission of the record companies.78
“In 2000, recorded music sales dropped for the first time in over twenty
67. CHANAN, supra note 40, at 5, 29–30; SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 15; Bakker, supra note
65, at 82.
68. Bakker, supra note 65, at 120. Others are far more critical of consolidation within the
recorded music industry. See, e.g., Dan Reese, Few Survive Heady Days of Independent Record
Labels, MEMPHIS BUS. J., Sept. 7–11, 1987, at 3 (interviewing a Memphis record producer and
musician who argues that smaller labels “got co-opted, coerced, swallowed up, recycled and
shoved down the throat of the American public by major record companies”).
69. M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE
DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 5 (10th ed. 2007).
70. KNOPPER, supra note 6, at 43–44 (“In [1984], sales jumped 625 percent, to 5.8 million; in
[2000], with Britney Spears, ‘NSync, Eminem, and the Backstreet Boys setting retail records that
may stand forever, CD sales reached an unprecedented 942 million.”).
71. Id. at 54 (describing how Sony’s profits increased by 60 percent during the CD boom and
Warner’s profits doubled).
72. See FRED GOODMAN, FORTUNE’S FOOL: EDGAR BRONFMAN JR., WARNER MUSIC, AND
AN INDUSTRY IN CRISIS 1 (2010) (“The record industry has become the canary in the internet coal
mine.”).
73. KNOPPER, supra note 6, at 208.
74. Harrang, supra note 41, at 43.
75. KNOPPER, supra note 6, at 169.
76. Id. at 177.
77. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 69, at 2.
78. GOODMAN, supra note 7272, at 145; accord KNOPPER, supra note 6, at 81 (“The least
frustrating way to obtain ‘I want It That Way’ in 1999 or 2000 was to download it for free.”).
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years,” 79 and it became readily apparent that these new consumption
methods for recorded music were “cannibaliz[ing] CD sales.”80 As Edgar
Bronfman Jr., former CEO of both Universal and Warner, observed, “The
days of the record industry dictating formats to the consumer are gone, and
they’re not coming back.”81
III. EMI-UNIVERSAL MERGER
A. FINANCIAL WOES
The recorded music industry continued to suffer as a whole, and EMI
took a particularly hard hit. 82 After demerging from its corporate owner
Thorn in 1996, EMI became the only publicly traded, stand-alone music
company,83 which left it in a poor position to handle the rapid developments
in the industry that followed.84
As sales and profits decreased, EMI “look[ed] at the bones of the
skeleton and rearrange[d] them”85 in massive cost-cutting exercises.86 EMI
“slashed A&R” (the division responsible for recruiting new artists), which
negatively impacted the influx of fresh hit-makers. 87 The company fired
1800 EMI employees and a quarter of its artist roster in 2002.88 Another
reduction in 2004 dismissed 1500 EMI workers and 20 percent of the
remaining musical acts. 89 Workplace morale suffered substantially as a
result, 90 and competitors cherry-picked many of the underpaid EMI
employees who had survived the onslaught.91 From 2002 to 2007, the total
music market shrank by 40 percent.92

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

GOODMAN, supra note 72, at 145.
KNOPPER, supra note 6, at 208.
GOODMAN, supra note 72, at 7.
SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 61.
See id. at 11, 61, 63.
See id. at 63 (interviewing Radiohead manager Bryce Edge, who remarks, “The day that
EMI demerged from Thorn and became a stand-alone shareholding music company was the
beginning of the end”).
85. Id. at 104.
86. Steve Knopper, How the Universal-EMI Deal Will Change the Music Industry, ROLLING
STONE (Nov. 23, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/how-the-universalemi-deal-will-change-the-music-industry-20111123.
87. Id.
88. SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 141–42 (“[T]hese included 49 artists in Finland, which
prompted [CEO] Levy to famously comment, ‘I think that’s a bit too many; I don’t think there are
49 Finns that can sing.’”).
89. Id. at 165.
90. See id. at 173 (“EMI’s problems and poor performance had an effect on us because it had
an effect on the morale of the staff at EMI. When share prices are falling and there are big
questions being asked about the company—which is making big reductions in staff—it absolutely
affected us because you went to meetings and met with people with long faces.”).
91. See id. at 170.
92. Id. at 193.
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B. TERRA FIRMA
In August 2007, the private equity firm Terra Firma Capital Partners,
Ltd. (Terra Firma) purchased EMI for £4.2 billion ($8.3 billion).93 Terra
Firma fronted £1.502 billion in equity,94 including 60 to 70 percent of the
personal assets of its CEO, Guy Hands 95 : “a specialist in buying failing
companies and turning them around.” 96 Terra Firma “borrowed the
remaining £2.74 billion from Citi[bank],”97 “which was both the seller and
the lender” in the transaction.98
Terra Firma created a chain of companies as an “investment vehicle” to
hold and finance EMI.99 Maltby Acquisitions, Ltd. (MAL) directly owned
all of EMI’s shares, 100 and Maltby Investments Ltd. (MIL) owned both
MAL and Terra Firma’s debt to Citibank from the purchase.101 MIL was a
subsidiary of Maltby Holdings, Ltd. (MHL),102 Terra Firma’s “unsecured

93. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703, [3] (Eng.); Citigroup / Maltby
Acquisitions Ltd., Merger Procedure Article 7(3) Decision of 1 Feb. 2011, Case No.
COMP/M.6137 ¶ 6 (EC) [hereinafter Derogation Decision], available at http://ec.europa.eu
/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6137_20110201_2014_2682547_EN.pdf;
KNOPPER,
supra note 6, at 88; The Magical Misery Tour: Terra Firma and EMI, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2011,
at 88 [hereinafter Magical Misery Tour], available at http://www.economist.com/node/18063824;
Chris V. Nicholson, Terra Firma and Citi to Begin EMI Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010, 7:30
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/08/19/terra-firma-and-citi-to-begin-emi-settlement-talks/.
94. Terra Firma Invs. (GP) 2 Ltd. v. Citigroup Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10459, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
118168, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010).
95. Peter Lattman, Hands on the Stand: Replaying the EMI Deal, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 20, 2010,
1:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/hands-on-the-stand-replaying-the-emi-deal/;
Citi to Protect EMI Bidders from Terra Firma Action, ALTASSETS (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www
.altassets.net/private-equity-news/citi-to-protect-emi-bidders-from-terra-firma-action.html
[hereinafter Citi to Protect EMI Bidders].
96. KNOPPER, supra note 6, at 231. See also TERRA FIRMA, TERRA FIRMA ANNUAL REVIEW
2007, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.terrafirma.com/annual-reviews.html?file=assets
/downloads/2007_Annual_Review.pdf (describing itself as a company with “[t]he ability to see
potential where others see only problems”).
97. Terra Firma Invs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118168, at *10.
98. Danny King, Citigroup Takes Back Record Company EMI from Terra Firma, DAILY FIN.
(Feb. 1, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/02/01/citigroup-takes-back-recordcompany-emi-from-terra-firma/.
99. Derogation Decision, supra note 93, ¶¶ 4–5; accord In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012]
EWHC (Ch) 703, [3] (Eng.).
100. Terra Firma Invs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118168, at *10; In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012]
EWHC (Ch) 703 at [2]; Derogation Decision, supra note 93, ¶ 4; Ed Christman, How Citigroup
Outfoxed Guy Hands in its Takeover of EMI, BILLBOARD (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.billboard.biz
/bbbiz/industry/record-labels/how-citigroup-outfoxed-guy-hands-in-its-1005020642.story.
101. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703 at [2]; Derogation Decision, supra note
93, ¶ 4; Christman, supra note 100.
102. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703 at [2]; Derogation Decision, supra note
93, ¶ 5; Christopher Spink, EMI Pre-Pack Bombshell, INT’L FIN. REV., Feb. 5, 2011, at 68,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/emi-prepack-idUSN0429587820110205.

2013]

Mergers of Majors

599

intercompany creditor,” 103 which in turn was owned by the “ultimate
holding company,” Maltby Capital, Ltd. (MCL).104
Separate boards of directors controlled each of the individual
companies. 105 “[T]he Maltby Capital Board had seven directors, five of
whom [were] employees of Terra Firma . . . .” 106 The board of MIL
consisted of three Terra Firma employees and two EMI executives: the
CEO and CFO.107
C. CITIBANK
In the summer of 2010, MIL restructured its board of directors by
removing the three Terra Firma employees and leaving only two EMI
executives: CEO Roger Faxon and CFO Ruth Prior.108 Although MIL was
not due to make its next loan payment until June 2011, 109 “Citigroup
reached out to Faxon and Prior in their roles as the only directors of Maltby
Investments and asked if there was a balance sheet insolvency/technical
default, and the directors had to conclude [that] there was.” 110 Three
separate valuations of MIL “supported the conclusion that the enterprise
value of the business (and thus of EMI Group) was substantially less than
the amount owed to Citi.”111 “Following this declaration, Citi called on its
right to accelerate the debt owed” under the terms of the loan agreement,112
which specified that Citigroup could step in if MIL was “deemed to or
declared to be unable to pay its debts.”113 On February 1, 2011, with the
cooperation of MIL’s two-person board,114 Citigroup foreclosed on EMI.115
MIL and Citigroup conducted a surprisingly large amount of business
in a matter of hours on that day.116 With their authority under the U.K.’s
103. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703 at [21].
104. Spink, supra note 102, at 68; accord Derogation Decision, supra note 93, ¶ 5; MALTBY
CAPITAL LIMITED, ANNUAL REVIEW 2009/10 31 (2010), available at http://www.emimusic.com
/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/MCL_AR_09101.pdf.
105. Christman, supra note 100.
106. Id.
107. Spink, supra note 102, at 68.
108. Christman, supra note 100; Spink, supra note 102, at 68.
109. Magical Misery Tour, supra note 93, at 88.
110. Christman, supra note 100; accord Derogation Decision, supra note 93, ¶ 10; Spink, supra
note 102, at 68 (“The move was triggered when Roger Faxon, the chief executive of the struggling
music company, declared a holding company insolvent and unable to service its debts.”).
111. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703, [27] (Eng.).
112. Derogation Decision, supra note 93, ¶ 11.
113. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703 at [12].
114. Derogation Decision, supra note 93, ¶ 10; but see Christman, supra note 100 (positing that
Citi and the MIL board “engineer[ed] an earlier-than-expected assumption of EMI ownership”).
115. King, supra note 98.
116. See In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703 at [21] (providing an hour-by-hour
breakdown of the day’s proceedings); Email from Roger Faxon, Chief Exec., EMI Music, to EMI
Music Staff (Feb. 1, 2011), in EMI’s Email to Staff on Citigroup Takeover, GUARDIAN (Feb. 7,
2011,
8:29
AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/feb/07/emi-roger-faxon-email
[hereinafter Faxon Email].
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insolvency laws, 117 Faxon and Prior appointed two administrators to
conduct a pre-pack administration proceeding, 118 which is the U.K.
counterpart of a pre-packaged Chapter 11 bankruptcy.119 “In this type of
insolvency, a business is marketed prior to an [administrator’s]
appointment. The sale is arranged before the company enters administration
and sold immediately after.” 120 As MIL’s only secured lender, Citigroup
opted to acquire 100 percent of Maltby’s share capital,121 making Citigroup
the new owner of EMI.122
The pre-pack, which was the largest in U.K. history,123 amounted to a
debt-for-equity swap. 124 In exchange for full ownership of MIL (and its
asset, EMI), Citigroup slashed around £2 billion of EMI’s debt125—a 65
percent reduction126—and “provid[ed] it with a cash balance of more than
300 million pounds.”127 The deal artificially restored EMI to balance-sheet
solvency.128
Citigroup may have made financial sacrifices in the pre-pack with
MIL, 129 but Terra Firma was the biggest loser. “With the value of the
business worth less than the 3.4 billion pounds of debt, Guy had no more
economic interest in the business; Terra Firma’s investment had no value . .
. .”130 As an unsecured creditor in the boardroom coup,131 Terra Firma lost
“the entirety of its investment of about £1.85bn,”132 and Guy Hands fled to

117. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sch. B1, ¶ 22 (U.K), available at http://www.legislation.gov
.uk/ukpga/1986/45/schedule/B1/data.pdf (“The directors of a company may appoint an
administrator.”).
118. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703 at [4].
119. Christman, supra note 100.
120. Rachael Singh, EMI’s Pre-Pack Could Be the Start of Things to Come, ACCOUNTANCY
AGE (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/analysis/2025777/emis-pre-pack-start;
accord Faxon Email, supra note 116.
121. CITIGROUP INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 290 (2011), available at http://www.citigroup
.com/citi/investor/quarterly/2011/ar10c_en.pdf.; accord In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC
(Ch) 703 at [4]; Juliette Garside, EMI Chiefs Forfeited £41m in Bonuses After Collapse into
Administration, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk
/business/2012/jan/04/emi-chiefs-forfeited-bonuses; Singh, supra note 120; Spink, supra note 102,
at 68.
122. Zack O’Malley Greenburg, Citi’s EMI Sale to Blavatnik on Hold?, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2011,
11:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2011/10/30/citi-emi-sale-toblavatnik-on-hold/.
123. Spink, supra note 102, at 68.
124. Derogation Decision, supra note 93, ¶ 13.
125. Christman, supra note 100; Faxon Email, supra note 116; Garside, supra note 121; Helen
Power, Pre-Packs: EMI First in a Wave of Restructures, LONDON TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at 32.
126. King, supra note 98.
127. Id.; accord Christman, supra note 100.
128. Derogation Decision, supra note 93, ¶ 13.
129. Garside, supra note 121.
130. Christman, supra note 100.
131. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703, [30] (Eng.); Singh, supra note 120.
132. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703 at [6]. Others estimate that the loss was
notably less. See, e.g., Christman, supra note 100 (quipping that “[w]hen all is said and done, it
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the island of Guernsey as a “tax exile” 133 after losing over half of his
personal net worth. 134 Justice Warren of the High Court of Justice in
London describes the legal challenges that spawned from Terra Firma’s
frustrations with Citigroup:
[T]here is enormous hostility between [Terra Firma] and Citi with two
battle-zones in place: first, the New York courts where [Terra Firma] seek
to recover their investment and, potentially at least, in London where they
may seek to say that the [administrators] were not validly appointed and
that there has been a sale at undervalue.135

Terra Firma’s litigation was initially unsuccessful both in the United
States 136 and England, 137 but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
remanded Terra Firma’s New York case for further proceedings.138
D. CITIGROUP SPLITS UP EMI AND SELLS TO UNIVERSAL
The “banking behemoth” Citigroup 139 never intended to maintain
ownership of EMI.140 Four months after gaining control of EMI from Terra
Firma, Citigroup placed the music company up for auction. 141 EMI’s
newfound solvency made it more appealing,142 and potential buyers began
to emerge. 143 Despite Roger Faxon’s insistence that EMI would remain
more valuable as a single entity,144 Citigroup stood to make greater profits
on the sale by splitting EMI into its recording and publishing divisions and
selling the two pieces separately.145

looks like Terra Firma paid a whopping 1.6 billion pounds to rent EMI for three and a half
years”); Garside, supra note 121 (quoting a £1.75 billion loss).
133. Dan Sabbagh, EMI’s Downfall: Will the Hits Keep Coming?, TIME (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1962165,00.html.
134. Lattman, supra note 95; Citi to Protect EMI Bidders, supra note 95.
135. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703 at [10].
136. Terra Firma Invs. (GP) 2 Ltd. v. Citigroup Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
137. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703.
138. Terra Firma Invs. (GP) 2 Ltd. v. Citigroup Inc., No. 11-126 (2d Cir. May 31, 2013),
available
at
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c452a13a-fc2c-489b-87c1a136f0f95fd8/2/doc/11-126_complete_opn.pdf.
139. See Andre Yoskowitz, Record Label EMI Faces Bank Takeover Due to Debts,
AFTERDAWN (Apr. 1, 2010, 11:49 PM), http://www.afterdawn.com/news/article.cfm/2010/04/02
/record_label_emi_faces_bank_takeover_due_to_debts.
140. Faxon Email, supra note 116.
141. Dana Cimilluca, Citigroup Betting on High EMI Bids, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203791904576611143998633526.html.
142. Magical Misery Tour, supra note 93, at 88.
143. Ed Christman, EMI: With Bids Low, Company Considers Whether to Split Up or Postpone
Sale, BILLBOARD (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/record-labels/emiwith-bids-low-company-considers-whether-1005416972.story.
144. Faxon Email, supra note 116 (“I have no doubt that the best possible way to yield the
highest value for EMI is to keep our businesses together in pursuit of our strategy.”).
145. Christman, supra note 143.
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On November 11, 2011, “Vivendi and its subsidiary, Universal Music
Group (UMG), announced . . . a definitive agreement to purchase EMI’s
recorded music division for a total consideration of £1.2bn [$1.9
billion].”146 Three days later, Citigroup sold EMI’s publishing division for
$2.2 billion (£1.4 billion) to a consortium led by the Sony Corporation that
included the estate of Michael Jackson, entertainment mogul David Geffen,
and several private investment firms.147
The combined $4.1 billion deal “le[ft] Citigroup as arguably the biggest
winner, as the bank [recovered] all of the money it lent Mr. Hands.”148
E. EMI-UNIVERSAL MERGER UNDERGOES ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
Both EMI and Universal control subsidiaries all around the world,149
and the announcement of their merger prompted numerous national
regulatory agencies to analyze the acquisition for anticompetitive effects.150
Among other governments, the United States and European Union chose to
conduct full investigations.151 In the United States, the merger was assigned
to the FTC. 152 Many interested organizations advocated for either the
approval153 or rejection154 of the consolidation, and both houses of Congress
probed the two music companies with questions and concerns.155

146. Press Release, Vivendi, Vivendi and Universal Music Group (UMG) to Purchase EMI
(Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Vivendi Press Release], available at http://www.vivendi.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/pr111111-vivendi-umg.pdf.
147. Laura Board, Sony Consortium Buys EMI Music Publishing, DEAL (Nov. 14, 2011, 5:22
AM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/tmt/sony-consortium-buys-emi-music-publishing.php.
148. Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Vivendi/EMI Deal Hits High Notes for Bankers, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 5, 2012, 6:39 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6f44232-f761-11e1-8c9d-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz2CR9wQc00.
149. Press Release, Universal Music Grp., Universal Music Group (UMG) to Sell EMI’s
European Stake in NOW THAT’S WHAT I CALL MUSIC! to Sony Music Entertainment (Feb. 27,
2013) [hereinafter UMG Press Release], available at http://www.universalmusic.com/corporate
/detail/2440.
150. Georg Szalai, Universal Music Gets U.S. Approval for EMI Acquisition, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Sept. 21, 2012, 8:43 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/universal-music-emideal-us-approval-372941.
151. Press Release, European Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Opens In-Depth Investigation
into Proposed Acquisition of EMI Recorded Music Business by Universal 1 (Mar. 23, 2012)
[hereinafter EC Mar. 2012 Press Release], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12311_en.pdf; Claire Atkinson, Citi’s EMI Deal on FTC Stage, N.Y. POST (Dec. 22, 2011, 3:16
PM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/citi_emi_deal_on_ftc_stage_rpGU1IuzrZLe2hXH
eHNbYN.
152. Atkinson, supra note 151.
153. See, e.g., Geoffrey Manne & Berin Szoka, UMG-EMI Deal Is No Threat to Innovation in
Music Distribution, INT’L CENTER L. & ECON., http://laweconcenter.org/component/content
/article/82-umg-emi-deal-is-no-threat-to-innovation-in-music-distribution.pdf (last visited June 5,
2013) (“UMG’s ability to raise prices on Lady Gaga’s music is hardly affected by the fact that it
might also own Lady Antebellum’s music . . . .”).
154. See, e.g., Groups Warn Congress of Dangers in Universal Music Group-EMI Merger,
PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/groups-warn-congressdangers-universal-music-group (“With a post-merger three-firm market share of 90%, and with

2013]

Mergers of Majors

603

The EMI-Universal merger was especially troubling to the EC, which
began its own in-depth investigation into the acquisition in March of 2012
“to make sure that consumers continue to have access to a wide variety of
music in different physical and digital formats at competitive conditions.”156
Six months later, following confidential negotiations between the European
Union and music companies, the EC announced that it would contingently
approve the merger upon Universal’s completion of several conditions.157
Most important, the EC required Universal to divest a slew of
successful EMI artists and subsidiary labels 158 that amounted to approximately one-third of EMI’s assets.159 In addition, “Universal committed to
selling EMI’s 50 percent stake in the popular Now! That’s What I Call
Music compilation” 160 and agreed to exclude “Most Favoured Nation”
clauses from its digital contracts worldwide for a period of ten years.161
The FTC “worked closely with the EC throughout the investigation,”162
and that same day, it announced its approval of the merger in light of the
EC’s divestment requirements.163 Subsequently, EMI sold its stake in the
Now! compilation series to Sony Music Entertainment164 and Warner Music

one or two companies following the lead of the dominant firm, the market would be vulnerable to
anticompetitive harm resulting from conscious parallelism.”).
155. Hearing on Future of Online Music, supra note 7; Ben Sisario, House Subcommittee
Wades into the Universal-EMI Deal, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Aug. 22, 2012, 5:06 PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/house-subcommittee-wades-into-theuniversal-emi-deal/ (reporting that “the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property,
Competition and the Internet sent a letter to executives at Universal and two other major labels,
asking pointed questions about how the merger would affect competition in the music industry”).
156. EC Mar. 2012 Press Release, supra note 151, at 1.
157. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Clears Universal’s
Acquisition of EMI’s Recorded Music Business, Subject to Conditions 2 (Sept. 21, 2012)
[hereinafter EC Sept. 2012 Press Release], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12999_en.pdf.
158. Id.
159. Ryan Bort, Universal’s Takeover of EMI Approved, PASTE (Sept. 21, 2012, 12:55 PM),
http://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2012/09/universals-takeover-of-emi-approved.html.
160. EC Sept. 2012 Press Release, supra note 157 at 2.
161. Id.
162. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Bureau of Competition Director Richard
A. Feinstein In the matter of Vivendi, S.A. and EMI Recorded Music 2 (Sept. 21, 2012)
[hereinafter Feinstein], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/comm/120921emifeinstein
statement.pdf.
163. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Closes its Investigation into Vivendi, S.A.’s
Proposed Acquisition of EMI Recorded Music (Sept. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/09/emi.shtm; Feinstein, supra note 162, at 2 (noting that “the
remedy obtained by the European Commission to address the different market conditions in
Europe will reduce concentration in the market in the United States as well”).
164. UMG Press Release, supra note 149.
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Group purchased the legendary Parlophone label. 165 The required divestments totaled around $350 million—more than Universal had anticipated.166
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FAILING FIRM DOCTRINE TO EMIUNIVERSAL
The sizeable divestment that regulatory agencies hoisted upon
Universal counteracted the careful planning of the music company and
disregarded its calculated negotiations with Citigroup. Hundreds of millions
of dollars of assets that Universal strategically acquired on the open market
were scattered among Universal’s competitors under obligations to the EC.
EMI’s dire situation within the music industry was no secret, and Universal
might have avoided its setbacks and retained full ownership of EMI’s
recorded music component by utilizing the failing firm doctrine.
A. EMI WAS A FAILING FIRM
As the doctrine’s name suggests, a failing firm must be failing—“a
corporation with resources so depleted that it face[s] the grave probability
of a business failure.” 167 By the DOJ/FTC Guidelines standard, the firm
must be “unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future,”168 and
an EC rescue merger requires that the firm “would in the near future be
forced out of the market if not taken over by another.” 169 Neither
International Shoe, the Guidelines, nor Kali + Salz requires that the
company in question actually fail, 170 and EMI’s acquisition appears to
qualify as failing.
The market collapsed after Terra Firma bought the debt-ridden EMI in
2007 at a premium price of £4.2 billion ($6.4 billion), and the private equity
firm had no realistic prospect of crawling out of that hole.171 Referencing
the purchase, Citigroup allegedly “described EMI as ‘a terminally ill cancer

165. Helienne Lindvall, Warner Buys Parlophone: Why Didn’t Artists and Indies Put Up a
Fight?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2013/feb/15
/warner-parlophone-artists-indies.
166. Foo Yun Chee & Diane Bartz, Europe, U.S. Approve Universal Purchase of EMI Unit,
REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/21/us-universal-emieu-idUSBRE88K0DD20120921.
167. Int’l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
168. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
169. Commission Decision No. 94/449/EC (Kali + Salz), 1994 O.J. L 186/38, ¶ 71, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1994:186:0038:0056:EN:PDF.
170. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
171. Chris Blackhurst, Investors in Debt-Ridden EMI Must Stump Up £100m or Call it Quits,
LONDON EVENING STANDARD, Feb. 4, 2010, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/investors-indebtridden-emi-must-stump-up-100m-or-call-it-quits-6769750.html (“Unfortunately, they will not
get anything like the £4.2 billion that Hands paid. Of all the deals done in the last boom, EMI
represents the high-water mark. It was right at the very end of the golden period . . . .”).
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patient on chemotherapy’” 172 and remarked that “[CEO] Guy [Hands]
stepped into one of the highest profile piles of doo doo out there.” 173
Financial journalist Felix Salmon explained the implications of Terra
Firma’s insistence on a debt write-down from Citigroup:
Terra Firma [asked] Citi to write down the principal amount owed, in
return for Terra Firma injecting hundreds of millions of dollars of new
money into EMI. . . .
. . . But any such option carries an implicit ultimatum: if you don’t write
down your loan, Terra Firma [said], then we won’t inject any more
money, and EMI will be forced into bankruptcy. . . .
. . . When a company declares bankruptcy, it essentially gets taken over by
its creditors. In this case, the creditor [was] Citi, . . . [but] the obvious Plan
A for any creditor faced with Terra Firma’s ultimatum is to seize the
company and sell it . . . .174

Peter Spratt, EMI’s own administrator in the transition of ownership to
Citigroup, acknowledged that the insolvent music company was in a state of
financial collapse.175
Impending liquidation is the surest sign that a firm is failing. 176
Ultimately, Citigroup split the proverbial baby and auctioned off EMI’s
recording and publishing components individually, but a real possibility
existed that the creditor would liquidate EMI’s assets in Chapter 7
bankruptcy or some equivalent177—that undeniable point at which a failing
company becomes a failed one.
Perhaps most significantly, the EC acknowledged EMI’s dismal
financial situation at length in a derogation proceeding during the pre-pack
administration. 178 The EC explained how rarely it derogates from its
obligation to suspend concentrations, 179 and it deemed such a decision
172. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Terra Firma Invs. (GP) 2 Ltd. v. Citigroup Inc., No. 110126-cv (2d Cir. April 25, 2011).
173. Memorandum of Law of Terra Firma Investments (GP) 2 Ltd. and Terra Firma
Investments (GP) 3 Ltd. in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 22, Terra
Firma Invs. (GP) 2 Ltd. v. Citigroup Inc, 725 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-CV10459).
174. Felix Salmon, Guy Hands and Citi’s Chinese Walls, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2009, 6:43 PM),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/12/16/guy-hands-and-citis-chinese-walls/.
175. See Power, supra note 125, at 32.
176. See Hearing on Failing Company Defense, supra note 12, at 36 (statement of Daniel C.
Schwartz, Deputy Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission).
177. Blackhurst, supra note 171 (explaining how Terra Firma might avoid cash injections on its
loans, “say ‘enough’ to throwing good money after bad[,] and try and claw something back from
EMI going into administration and being broken up”); Zé Pequeno, 2010: The Inevitable Fall and
Destruction of EMI, TINY MIX TAPES (Dec. 2010), http://www.tinymixtapes.com/features/2010inevitable-fall-and-destruction-emi (“Total liquidation would certainly clear Guy Hands of the
billions in debt he faces . . . .”).
178. See Derogation Decision, supra note 93.
179. Id. ¶ 22.
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appropriate when “the target is on the brink of bankruptcy and only
immediate implementation of the deal would avoid a further grave
deterioration of the situation.”180 The EC recognized “the risk of [a] cascade
of bankruptcies of the 270 EMI group operating companies all over the
world” 181 and waived the suspension of the purchase to avoid “further
financial difficulties . . . and the decline of EMI’s business.”182
Less than one year passed between the derogation decision and EMIUniversal merger.183 Considering the EC’s grim financial forecast for EMI
in the derogation decision, EMI-Universal could have made a strong
argument that EMI was failing and that the purchase was a rescue merger.
EMI’s “balance sheet insolvency . . . reflect[ed] the enormous gulf between
the value of the Company’s assets and the extent of its liabilities”184—a
recipe for financial failure under any standard.
B. EMI COULD NOT HAVE SUCCESSFULLY REORGANIZED
The Guidelines state that, in order for the failing firm doctrine to apply,
the firm must not “be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Act,” 185 a requirement reflected in the Court’s Citizen
Publishing decision—“[t]he prospects of reorganization . . . would have to
be dim or nonexistent.”186 This element is absent from the E.U. standard.187
Scholars have proffered two varying explanations of what constitutes an
“unsuccessful” Chapter 11 reorganization,188 and under either standard, an
EMI reorganization would have been unsuccessful.
One standard for a failed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding is a
“return[] to [C]hapter 11 within a set period of time.” 189 According to
Professor Edward Altman, “[I]t seems clear that if a firm is forced to seek
another distressed restructuring within a relatively short period of time after
emerging, the process was not a success at all.” 190 It is important to
emphasize that the FTC and DOJ consider the likely success of a
prospective hypothetical reorganization of an allegedly failing firm’s
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 18.
Compare Derogation Decision, supra note 93 (taking place on January 2, 2011), with
Vivendi Press Release, supra note 146 (announcing the purchase of EMI on November 11, 2011).
184. In re Maltby Invs., Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 703, [31] (Eng.).
185. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
186. Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969).
187. See Commission Decision No. 94/449/EC (Kali + Salz), 1994 O.J. L 186/38, ¶ 71,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1994:186:0038:0056
:EN:PDF.
188. Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter 11 ‘Failure’ 3 (Seton Hall Pub. Law, Research Paper No.
1375163, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375163.
189. Id.
190. Edward I. Altman et al., Post-Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Performance: Avoiding Chapter 22,
21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 53, 53 (2009).
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debt. 191 Accordingly, under the failing firm doctrine, these government
entities deem the prospective Chapter 11 reorganization of the failing firm
unsuccessful if the firm would prospectively return to a second, imaginary
reorganization. 192 The further down this rabbit hole of hypothetical
reorganizations one goes, the easier it becomes to understand the rarity of
the doctrine’s usage 193 and the rightful criticism that the “unsuccessful
reorganization” requirement has drawn.194
The case of EMI is unique because the music company already
underwent the U.K. equivalent of a pre-packaged Chapter 11 bankruptcy
only nine months before it was sold to Universal, 195 which provides
additional insight into the “Return to Chapter 11” analysis. Any subsequent
Chapter 11 proceeding (hypothetical or not) would signal the failure of
EMI’s pre-pack, especially considering that a company is significantly less
likely to succeed in a second round of Chapter 11 proceedings.196 The very
fact that EMI had recently undergone the U.K. equivalent of Chapter 11
bankruptcy indicates that a later reorganization would fail.
Conversely, other scholars “argue that [C]hapter 11 fails if the debtor
liquidates rather than reorganizes.” 197 Using this draconian logic, an
onlooker might have deemed the rearrangement of the Titanic’s deck chairs
unsuccessful when the ship sank to the bottom of the ocean. Of course, one
can safely say that a business method is unsuccessful when the business
itself fails, but the standard for an unsuccessful restructuring under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code should be much less stringent. The failing firm
doctrine does not require a firm to completely fail—rather, it seeks to
prevent both the exit of the company’s assets from the market and the social
consequences of a complete failure.198 Once again, the prospective nature of
this element of the failing firm defense renders an actual analysis of Chapter
11 failure impossible.
As previously mentioned, despite the overly strict nature of a
liquidation standard and its arguable inapplicability to a failing firm
analysis, a real possibility existed that Citigroup would liquidate EMI under
Chapter 7.199 “In a typical Chapter 7 liquidation case, the trustee collects the
nonexempt property of the debtor, converts that property to cash, and
distributes the cash to the creditors.”200 “In return the debtor is discharged

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138; MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
See supra Part I.A.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 283; Nigro & Kanter, supra note 22, at 8.
See supra note 26.
Christman, supra note 100.
Altman, supra note 190, at 53.
Lubben, supra note 188, at 3.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 274–75.
Blackhurst, supra note 171; Pequeno, supra note 177.
DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 8 (1993).
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from all liabilities and is granted [a] ‘fresh start.’”201 In the strict sense of
the word, Citigroup did liquidate EMI’s assets following EMI’s previous
U.K. pre-pack. Citigroup became both the owner and sole secured creditor
of EMI, which entitled Citigroup to convert EMI to cash and distribute that
cash as it saw fit (i.e., to take the money and run). 202 In addition, Citigroup
sold EMI’s recorded music component to Universal—a competitor who
would incorporate the assets into its pre-established business model203 as
opposed to another private equity firm, which would have dumped the
purchase price back on top of EMI as debt like Terra Firma did.204 Through
a combination of the pre-pack administration and the sale of EMI to
Universal, Citigroup satisfied itself as the creditor and gave EMI the “fresh
start” that it needed.205
Because “the Chapter 11 of a big business usually leads to some form
of reorganization of the company that is ‘successful’ at least in the sense
that some part of the business continues as a going concern,”206 some might
argue that EMI would have survived without merging. However, as already
explained, the facts surrounding EMI’s sale to Universal are far from
usual. 207 Many have also opined that “the potentially rewarding but
notoriously unpredictable international music business” 208 is a different
animal entirely from typical large corporations and deserves separate
considerations not present in most industries.209
Because EMI underwent a U.K. pre-pack administration, which closely
resembles Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States, others might argue
that a U.S. Chapter 11 proceeding would be successful. This logic assumes
that applying for bankruptcy makes it successful, 210 but post-Chapter 11
companies statistically face significant hardships in the years following
reorganization.211 In the case of EMI, Citigroup sold the music company as
soon as possible after the pre-pack, and onlookers can only speculate as to
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 449.
CITIGROUP INC., supra note 121, at 290.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Parts III.C–D.
EPSTEIN, supra note 200, at 734–35.
See supra Parts III.B–D.
SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 11.
See, e.g., Hearing on Future of Online Music, supra note 7, at 22 (Mr. Azoff states: “I
think that we are a very unique industry, . . . [s]o I do not think you can apply [normal antitrust
principles]—you know, we are a quirky, crazy industry . . . .”).
210. Altman, supra note 190, at 53–54 (“[U]nless there is convincing opposition from interested
parties, the bankruptcy court has little choice but to sanction the plan as presented. Since most
corporate advisors and relevant stakeholders have a bias toward emerging as soon as possible,
opposition is fairly rare.”).
211. Id. at 54 (“[M]ore than two-thirds of those companies underperformed their industry peers
for up to five years following bankruptcy. And some studies reported that as many as 40% of
those companies continued to experience pre-interest operating losses in the first three years after
emergence.”).
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how successful the reorganization would have been if EMI had filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.212 Considering the financial struggles and loss of
key artists that EMI suffered prior to administration in the United
Kingdom, 213 it is likely that the corporation would have continued to
struggle in the industry.
C. EMI MADE GOOD-FAITH OFFERS AND HAD NO OTHER
PURCHASERS
The Guidelines require a failing firm to make “unsuccessful good-faith
efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers that . . . pose a less severe
danger to competition.”214 In the European Union, rescue mergers are only
allowed if “there is no less anticompetitive alternative purchase.” 215
Citigroup satisfied both of these requirements during its sale of EMI to
Universal.
EMI was less attractive to other purchasers during the auction; because
of past “massive restructure[s] to take costs out, . . . the fat had already been
removed.”216 As the music company fell further into debt and became less
and less of a competitor in the recorded music industry, “the well of
potential buyers for EMI [began to] dry[] up.”217 Universal emerged as the
only legitimate bidder, and Citigroup capitalized on the opportunity to
sell.218
In addition, “companies in the technology industries . . . see no real
need to be content owners.”219 The only interested parties to a transaction of
the magnitude of EMI’s sale were direct competitors who could create
synergies between the acquired business and cut costs. 220 “There was no
one else out there.”221 Although Warner Music Group was predicted to be
the high bidder, it withdrew from the auction.222 Universal was the only

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.A.
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 11.
Commission Decision No. 94/449/EC (Kali + Salz), 1994 O.J. L 186/38, ¶ 71.
SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 142.
Id. at 98.
See supra Part III.D.
SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 116.
See Update on EMI Auction, AL LINDSTROM (Oct. 7, 2011), http://allindstrom.com
/2011/10/news-update-on-emi-auction/ (“The turbulent capital markets have supposedly chased
away the other private equity bidders.”).
221. SOUTHALL, supra note 45, at 103.
222. Halperin, supra note 1 (quoting Mr. Azoff, who stated that “Warner had the chance to
outbid Universal in this process—but chose to walk away”); Universal, Sony Trump Rival
Companies’ Bids in EMI Auction Victory, SMART BUSINESS (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www
.sbnonline.com/2011/11/universal-sony-trump-rival-companies%E2%80%99-bids-in-emi-auctionvictory/ (describing how “in a surprise, Warner Music walked away from the auction after failing
to agree to terms for taking over EMI’s pension liabilities”).
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legitimate bidder, and Citigroup made a good-faith effort to elicit other bids
when it held an open auction for EMI.223
V. PRACTICAL APPLICATION AND CONCERNS
Stubbornness and large egos have plagued mergers of recorded music
companies in the past.224 When record executives can hardly agree to join
forces with one another, it becomes a practical issue that many would never
admit that their company is on the verge of economic collapse. To be fair,
calling oneself a failing firm is not the most majestic way to go gentle into
that good night.
At least one government official expressed interest about whether EMI
could utilize the failing firm doctrine. In June 2012, during a meeting of the
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer
Rights, Gigi Sohn—president of the public interest group Public
Knowledge and adamant opponent of the Universal-EMI merger—made a
statement225 and submitted written testimony.226 In her thorough application
of the Guidelines to the merger, Ms. Sohn included a one-paragraph
disposal of the failing firm doctrine.227 During Ms. Sohn’s statement to the
Subcommittee and in the presence of the CEOs of both EMI and Universal,
Senator Michael Lee acknowledged that Sohn had discarded the failing firm
doctrine and stated that as far as he knew, no one had bothered to claim the
defense. 228 Neither Gigi Sohn, Roger Faxon (CEO of EMI), nor Lucian
Grainge (CEO of Universal) responded to Senator Lee’s remark about the
failing firm doctrine’s absence.229
In addition, as discussed above, the failing firm doctrine is largely an
educated prediction of hypothetical outcomes and very little precedent
exists for the defense’s utilization. In most circumstances, merging
corporations would find little refuge in the strict elements of the doctrine
and would be well advised to focus on more traditional means to show a
lack of anti-competitive effects. 230 The prospective nature of the U.S.
element requiring a company’s failure during a hypothetical Chapter 11
bankruptcy creates a significant level of uncertainty for the minority of
firms who do raise the defense.231 However, the unique circumstances of the
EMI-Universal merger suggest that the parties could have beaten the odds
and prevailed under the failing firm doctrine.
223. See supra Part III.D.
224. KNOPPER, supra note 6, at 206.
225. Hearing on Future of Online Music, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Gigi Sohn, President,
Public Knowledge).
226. Id. at 190.
227. Id. at 203.
228. Id. at 18.
229. See id.
230. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part IV.B.
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VI. FAILING FIRM DEFENSE: OTHER APPLICATIONS
“The . . . Guidelines provide explicitly that transfers of intellectual
property are to be analyzed under [its] standards . . . .”232 However, in the
over eighty years that it has existed, “the failing firm [doctrine] has not been
yet applied in a reported merger involving intellectual property.”233 With
the ongoing rapid advancements in technology and the copyrights, patents,
trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property that protect them,
companies that work with intellectual property and find themselves on the
brink of failure should consider the failing firm doctrine.
As an analysis of EMI demonstrates in the case at hand, even large
corporations owning millions of works of intellectual property may fall
from power and need to join forces with a competitor to avoid complete
failure. Although the various elements of the failing firm doctrine demand
that qualifying firms meet very particular circumstances, it is likely that
many companies involved in technology and intellectual property that have
undergone antitrust scrutiny and faced burdensome divestment
requirements have overlooked the failing firm doctrine.
It is already commonplace in mergers and acquisitions to specify in the
sale which company will bear the risks of antitrust enforcement agency
investigations. 234 Where applicable, it follows that the weaker, acquired
firm could use its consent or refusal to undergo failing firm analysis during
antitrust scrutiny as a point of negotiation. Such a provision is justified
because a would-be failing firm risks a botched antitrust clearance, which
would cast it back out into the marketplace with the “failing firm” stigma
over its head. In the case at hand, for example, Citigroup could have agreed
with Universal to cooperate completely with a full-fledged implementation
of the failing firm doctrine in exchange for more favorable merger terms.
Although such a provision would not apply to run-of-the-mill mergers, the
failing firm doctrine is strong medicine, and a deteriorating company that is
being acquired would be wise to consider advocating for such a provision in
its merger agreement.

232. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 410.
233. Id. at 437.
234. See Scott A. Sher & Valarie Hogan, Getting the Deal Done: Antitrust Risk-Shifting
Provisions in Merger Agreements, 12 THRESHOLD 65, 65 (2011), available at
http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/sher_fall11.pdf (“As competition agencies around the
world have increased their scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions, businesses and their
antitrust counsel must increasingly pursue strategies to manage merger-related antitrust risk.
. . . After properly assessing risk, counsel can help their clients mitigate their risk exposure
by drafting merger agreements that anticipate and provide for the repercussions each party
may face if the deal is blocked or must be altered to gain antitrust approval.”).
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CONCLUSION
For the greater part of a century, the failing firm doctrine has perplexed
the regulatory agencies and practitioners tasked with decrypting it235 and
has evaded the corporations hoping to utilize it. A separate version of the
doctrine—the rescue merger—has emerged in the European Union, which
contains its own unique oddities but is at least as difficult to actualize as its
American counterpart. 236 Antitrust authorities have reassured the mergers
and acquisitions community that the failing firm doctrine is still good law,
but they are always quick to illustrate how limited of a defense it actually is.
The Court has remained silent in regards to the failing firm doctrine for
nearly half of a century, but the DOJ and FTC have continued to look to its
opinions and the resultant passages of their Guidelines to enforce the
common-law defense.237 With the increased usage of the doctrine, the Court
might feel more inclined to clarify which elements it endorses and how to
apply them more effectively.
This critical analysis of a recorded music company that had fallen on
hard times demonstrates that, though restrictive, the failing firm doctrine
still has a place in today’s society. Subjecting corporations and their
employees to complete catastrophe is not always necessary, and the
purchasers of failing firms need not be punished in the form of large
divestments or barred mergers. The failing firm doctrine was applicable to
the EMI-Universal merger, and future failing companies undergoing
antitrust scrutiny should consider dusting off the defense to avoid similar
oversight.
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